ABSTRACT This paper investigates the multi-user power control problem in relay-assisted anti-jamming systems. Because of the hierarchical confrontation characteristics between users and jammer, we take the incomplete information and observation error into consideration and formulate an anti-jamming Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game, in which primary users act as leaders, relay users act as vice-leaders, and jammer acts as a follower. Both users and jammer have the ability to sense others' transmission power and choose optimal power to realize the maximum of utility. Based on the backward induction method, we propose a multi-user hierarchical iterative algorithm to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) and prove the existence and uniqueness of SE. Finally, simulation results are compared with the Nash equilibrium to verify the effectiveness of the proposed game. Moreover, both the influence of incomplete information and the observation error on utility are analyzed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless anti-jamming technology has played an important role in ensuring the security and reliability of communication so far, and it will become a hot topic for a long time in the future. Many anti-jamming technologies have been proposed in power domain [1] - [10] , frequency domain [11] - [18] , and spatial domain [19] - [23] , among which the power anti-jamming technology was generally considered as a direct and effective method. While in relay-assisted communication networks, the existing power anti-jamming work mainly focused on the single-user situation [6] , [7] , which had achieved some effects but couldn't satisfy the multi-user condition. In this study, considering the incomplete information and observation error, we investigate the multi-user power control problem in relay-assisted communication networks.
In power domain [1] - [10] , the anti-jamming technology usually adopts the method of adjusting transmission power to ensure the normal communication, which is a direct way to realize anti-jamming communication and has already been widely used. However, in power anti-jamming field, the existing technologies are not perfect enough due to the limitations of application environment. Generally, there are still some problems haven't been solved. Firstly, the multiuser situation which is common to see in wireless communication was rarely investigated. Secondly, considering the antagonisms between user and jammer, both the incomplete information and observation error need to be considered simultaneously.
In this paper, we mainly study the power control problem of multi-user in relay-assisted communication networks. For jammer, it aims at reducing communication quality by adjusting jamming power. To improve anti-jamming ability, users need an effective power control method to choose optimal transmission power when facing different jamming strategies, which is meaningful to guarantee reliable communication. However, it is hard to obtain the optimal power strategy and we mainly face the following challenges: (i) The single-user power control optimization approach can't be used directly in multi-user situation because of the joint constraint condition and operation complexity. (ii) User should act as leader to have first advantage compared to jammer in the communication. (iii) We need to take the incomplete information and observation error into consideration simultaneously.
Considering the hierarchical confrontation characteristics between users and jammer, we propose an anti-jamming Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game. In the formulated game, the users are consisted of primary users which act as leaders and relay users which act as vice-leaders, while the jammer acts as follower. Given the utility functions of primary users, relay users and jammer, we derive the closedform expressions of Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) based on the duality optimization theory [33] , [34] and obtain the optimal power strategy. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• In the multi-user situation, considering the incomplete information and observation error, a Bayesian threelayer Stackelberg game is formulated to model and analyze the power control problem in relay-assisted communication networks, in which primary users act as leaders, relay users act as vice-leaders and jammer acts as follower.
• The Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) is obtained as the optimal power strategy. In order to obtain SE, we propose a multi-user hierarchical iterative algorithm (MHIA). Moreover, both the existence and uniqueness of SE are proved.
• Simulation results are given to analyze the influence of observation error, radius of fluctuation, jamming distance and jamming cost on utility. We also compare the users' utilities of SE and Nash Equilibrium (NE) to prove the effectiveness of game proposed in this paper. In the rest of this paper, we analyze the related work in Section II. In Section III, we establish system model and give relative formulation about the power control problem. In Section IV, we propose an anti-jamming Bayesian threelayer Stackelberg game and obtain optimal power strategy based on Stackelberg Equilibrium. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of SE are proved. Simulation results and some necessary discussions are shown in Section V. In Section VI, we draw a conclusion from the above analysis.
II. RELATED WORK
There is no doubt that anti-jamming communication technology has increasingly captured considerable attention and a large number of studies have been accomplished in the recent years. In [24] and [25] , the authors introduced game theoretic to analyze wireless communication. In [26] , the authors formulated a non-zero-sum game to model the communication process with transmission cost. A zero-sum game was proposed to analyze the relationship between secondary user and jammer in [14] . In [27] , a stochastic game was modeled in multi-agent scene. In [28] , considering the incomplete information, the authors proposed a Bayesian game to analyze the attacks in wireless networks. Based on the hierarchical confrontation characteristics between user and jammer, the authors adopted Stackelberg game [1] - [10] which is a appropriate tool to model the anti-jamming problem. In [1] , the authors analyzed two models about the single-channel and multi-channel problem. Moreover, the optimal strategy was obtained through Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE), and the existence of SE was also proved. In [2] , considering the observation error, the authors proposed a Stackelberg game to model the anti-jamming problem that user acted as leader firstly, and then jammer acted as follower. In [3] , the authors investigated the anti-jamming communication under incomplete information. In [4] , a cooperative anti-jamming mechanism based on price was proposed, and a multiple-leader one-follower Stackelberg game was formulated to solve the anti-jamming transmission problem. In [5] , the authors combed the antijamming technologies under different scenarios.
Introduction of relay further expends communication application scenario and can help user improve communication quality effectively [29] - [32] . In relay-assisted antijamming communication networks [6] , [7] , the relay node was existed to help the source node transmit messages and guarantee communication quality, which acted as vice-leader in the Stackelberg game. The relay selection problem was also considered in [7] as there are multi relays to select at the same time. However, as the number of users increasing gradually in the communication system, relay need to allocate power for different channels simultaneously under the joint constraint condition, and the methods in [6] and [7] are no longer applicable to multi-user situation. Moreover, the incomplete information and observation error shouldn't be ignored.
With the development of anti-jamming technology, the multi-user situation [8] , [9] were also investigated. Considering the mutual interference [8] among users, the authors proposed a sub-gradient based Bayesian Stackelberg iterative algorithm to realize the power optimization problem in multi-user situation, while the jammer acted as leader and users acted as followers in the proposed game. In [9] , the authors proposed two game under different decisionmaking scenarios that users and jammer made strategies based on sense or not. While in the actual communication, jammer makes malicious jamming attack mainly depends on user's transmission situation to avoid ineffective jamming, which decides the role assignment that user is leader and jammer is follower, but it was not considered in [8] and [9] .
Different from the existing work, we formulate a Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game that primary users act as leaders, relay users act as vice-leaders, and jammer acts as follower, which is common to see in relay-assisted communication networks. Moreover, because of the hierarchical competitive relationships between users and jammer, the incomplete information and observation error are also considered in this paper.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume that there exist multiple transmitters as primary users (PUs), a relay and a intelligent jammer in communication networks, and the relay have many antennas as relay users (RUs) to help PUs broadcast messages to legitimate receivers, which is shown in Fig. 1 . Each userpair contains of a primary user (PU) and a relay user (RU), transmitting messages on the common channel. In order to guarantee each user-pair has an independent channel so that the co-channel mutual interference can be avoided, the channels are pre-allocated to all user-pairs before communication. Moreover, both users and jammer could sense others' power, and then make strategies to achieve the maximum of utility, which is reflected in the model that PUs transmit messages firstly, then RUs choose power to help PUs transmit packets after knowing PUs' strategies, and jammer selects its jamming power based on the sense result of users' power in the last.
In the above model, the available channel set is . . , q n , . . . , q N ], in which q n (n ∈ N ) denotes the nth RU's transmission power on the nth channel, and q −n = [q 1 , . . . , q n−1 , q n+1 , . . . , q N ] denotes the relay users' transmission power set except the nth RU. J denotes the total jamming power on all channels. Moreover, the background noise is denoted as N 0 . Inspired by the path-loss model [35] , [36] which has been widely used in the communication, the channel gain between the mth PU, nth RU and the legitimate receiver are denoted as α m = d −δ m and η n = v −δ n , where δ is the pass-loss factor, d m and v n denote the distance of between the mth PU, nth RU and the legitimate receiver, respectively. Similarly, the channel gain of jamming link is denoted as β = w −δ , where w denotes the distance between jammer and the legitimate receiver. For convenience, we list some necessary notations related to this paper in Table 1 . 
Assumption 2: For jammer, considering it is uncertain about user information, we assume the channel gain α m , η n of the mth PU-receiver pair and nth RU-receiver pair has H and L positive states respectively, which contains α m1 , . . . , α mh , . . . , α mH and η n1 , . . . , η nl , . . . , η nL . The transmission cost E of jammer has T positive states, which contains E 1 , . . . , E t , . . . , E T . The joint probability distribution of α m , η n , E can be defined as σ (α mh , η nl , E t ), and we can get
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In relay-assisted communication networks, a cooperative group consisted of multi user-pairs is competitive with the malicious jammer. Considering the hierarchical competitive VOLUME 7, 2019 relationships and constraint of incomplete information, we use the Stackelberg Game, which is an effective tool to build the anti-jamming model, to solve the power control optimization problem. Based on the formulated model, we propose a Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game, in which PUs act as leaders, and RUs act as vice-leaders, while jammer acts as follower.
Considering the observation error of jammer, we define the error factor ε m = |p m −p m |/p m and ε (r) n = |q n −q n |/q n , wherẽ p m ,q n are the jammer's estimated power of the mth PU and nth RU. Similarly, for users, the error factor can be defined as ς k = |J k − J k |/J k , whereJ k denotes jammer's power on the kth channel estimated by user. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 2 , the jamming model belongs to partial band jamming. Jammer transmits signals on all channels at the same time and allocates power equally to each channel 1 , which meets the following power constraint condition:
where J k (k ∈ K) denotes the jammer's power on the kth channel, and J max denotes the maximum jamming power of jammer. Inspired by [1] - [3] , we give the utility function based on Signal-on-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) which has been widely used. We define the jammer's utility with the incomplete information of the PU's, RU's channel gain α, η and jammer's unit power cost E in the following:
where σ (α ih , η il , E t ) denotes the joint probability distribution of α i , η i and E.
Similarly, considering the incomplete information of jammer's channel gain β and unit power cost D of RUs, the utility of relay (i.e., the total utilities of all RUs) is defined as:
where ν i (β x , D iz ) denotes the joint probability distribution of β and D i . Similar to the utility function above, considering the incomplete information of channel gain β and unit power cost C m of the mth PU, we define the mth PU's utility as:
. (4) where π m (β x , C mz ) denotes the joint probability distribution of β and C m . According to the utility functions given above, all users and jammer aim to achieve the maximum of respective utility, and the power control optimization problem can be solved by the three-layer programming method, which is shown as follows:
IV. THE POWER OPTIMIZATION STRATEGY BASED ON BAYESIAN THREE-LAYER STACKELBERG GAME
In this section, we define the Nash Equilibrium (NE) and Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) firstly. Then we figure out the optimal power of follower, vice-leaders, leaders successively and propose a multi-user hierarchical iterative algorithm (MHIA) to obtain SE. Moreover, we prove the existence and uniqueness of SE. In the last, the close-form expressions of NE was given. As users and jammer select transmission power independently and simultaneously, we model the power control problem as a static game, and Nash Equilibrium (NE) [37] , [38] can be viewed as the optimal strategy of the static game. After achieving NE, no user could have a higher utility by changing transmission power unilaterally.
While in the proposed anti-jamming Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game, there exist multi primary users act as leaders, relay users act as vice-leaders and a jammer acts as follower. Primary users take actions firstly and they have first advantages to choose certain power strategies so as to maximize their utilities under the constraint condition, which means primary users have the higher priority compared to relay users and jammer. Then the vice-leaders sub-game converges to equilibrium based on the observation of primary users' power and relay users choose optimal strategies maximize relay's utility. After observing primary users' and relay users' transmission power, the jammer updates jamming power until the follower sub-game converges to equilibrium in the last and acts as follower in the game. Through several iterations, we obtain Stackelberg Equilibrium as the optimal joint strategy of PUs, RUs and jammer, which can be expressed as (P * , Q * , j * ) and is shown in Fig. 3 .
. . , q * N ] denote the optimal power strategy set of all PUs and RUs respectively, in which p * m denotes the mth PU's optimal power, and q * n denote the nth RU's optimal power. j * denotes the sum of optimal jamming power on all channels. The optimal strategy obtained from SE maximizes the utilities of users and jammer. Under power constraints, for any user or jammer, the optimal strategy should satisfy the following conditions:
where
denotes the optimal power strategy set of all RUs except the nth RU.
A. FOLLOWER SUB-GAME
In the Stackelberg Game, the backward induction method is an effective method to achieve SE. For jammer, it observes the PUs' and RUs' transmission power firstly, and then it changes jamming power to realize the maximum of utility. Because of the observation error, the power control optimization problem of jammer can be denoted as:
Considering the incomplete information, we assume the ith PU's, RU's channel gain α i , η i and jamming cost E are mutually independent. For jammer, α i has H states and the probability of α ih is ϕ ih , H h=1 ϕ ih = 1. Similarly, η i has L states, E has T states, and the probability of η il , E t are κ il , θ t respectively, and
So the utility of jammer can be simplified as follows:
Theorem 1: The jammer's optimal power J * is given by:
where J is shown in equation (14) .
Proof: The utility function of jammer is a concave function because of:
Therefore, it is a convex optimization problem for jammer to obtain the optimal jamming strategy. Jammer's utility is concave and it has the unique maximal value only when making the first derivative equal to 0. Based on duality optimization theory [33] , [34] , the jammer's Lagrange function can be denoted as follows after introducing the nonnegative dual variable µ:
Then, we can obtain the Lagrange function in the following:
Based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [33] , [34] , we let:
and we can get the jamming power:
Because of the non-negativity of power, we add the condition 1 to further classify the optimal jamming power. When the current jammer's observation of users' transmission power
0 /β, jammer would choose optimal jamming power J . Otherwise, jammer would choose to ignore the present transmission and adjust jamming power to 0.
B. VICE-LEADER SUB-GAME
Similarly, the RUs' power control optimization problem can be expressed as:
For relay users, the jammer's channel gain β and the nth RU's transmission cost D n are mutually independent, among which, β has X states and the probability of β x is γ x , X x=1 γ x = 1. Similarly, D n has Z states and the probability of D nz is χ nz , Z z=1 χ nz = 1. Taking J * into equation (3) , and the utility of relay is:
where q∧, q∨ are expressed as follows:
Theorem 2:
The nth vice-leader's optimal power q * n is given by:
Proof: According to the utility of relay, we can find R is a linear function about q n with a slope of k n = η n N 0 − Z z=1 χ nz D nz when q∧ ≤ q∨, and the critical value of q n is:
When q∧ > q∨, since:
it is a concave function. Similarly, after introducing the nonnegative dual variable ψ, we get the Lagrange function as follows:
Similar to the solution process in part A, we have:
the power is obtained by solving the optimization problem and it is shown as follows:
On the basis of the analysis above, the nth RU's optimal strategy can be obtained through the following discussion: 1) q n ≤ 0, q n > 0 or q n > 0, q n < q n : In these cases, the utility increases when q n ≤ q n and decreases when q n > q n , so the utility reaches the maximum value at q n = q n , i.e., q n = q n . 2) q n > 0, q n ≥ q n , k n > 0: In this case, we can find the utility function is a linear increasing function when 0 < q n ≤ q n and a decreasing function when q n > q n , so the maximum of utility is reached at q n = q n , i.e., q n = q n . 3) q n ≤ 0, q n ≤ 0 or q n > 0, q n ≥ q n , k n ≤ 0: In the first case, the utility function is a decreasing function when q n > 0; in the second case, the utility function is also a decreasing function but the difference from the former case is that it decreases linearly when q n < q n . In the two cases, the utility reaches the maximum value at q n = 0, i.e., q n = 0. 4) To summarize, because of the upper limit of relay transmission power, the total power of all the relay users can't exceed q max , so we have
Through the discussion above, RUs can get the optimal transmission power through analysing the numerical relationship between q n , q n and k n . When q n ≤ 0, q n ≤ 0, we can get p n ≥ p n which is expressed in equation (29), i.e., the nth PU's transmission power meets the current communication, or when q n > 0, q n ≥ q n , k n ≤ 0, we can get Z z=1 χ nz D nz ≥ η n N 0 , i.e. transmission cost of the nth RU is too high to absorb in the current state. In the above two cases, the RU chooses to not send messages and adjusts transmission power to zero. Otherwise, it will select the optimal power to improve communication quality based on equation (17) .
C. LEADER SUB-GAME
Similarly, the PUs' power control optimization problem can be expressed as:
Similarly, for primary users, the jammer's channel gain β and transmission cost C m are mutually independent. Among which, β has X states and the probability of β x is γ x , i.e., (4), we can get the utility of the mth PU in different cases as follows:
where the value of q * m , J * m under different cases are shown as follows:
in the cases of 4, 5, 6, 7, the RUs' transmission power meets M i=1 q i <q max , while in the cases of 8, 9,
The mth leader's optimal power p * m is given by:
where p m , p m , p m are shown in equation (28), (29) , (31), respectively. Proof: According to the utility function above, we discuss the following cases: 1) 4: It is a concave function, since:
Similarly, after introducing the nonnegative dual variable λ m , we get the Lagrange function as follows:
After solving the unary cubic equation of C, we get: 
When b m > 0, the utility function is an increasing function and it will reach the maximum at p m = p m , i.e., p * m = p m ; when b m ≤ 0, the utility function is a decreasing function and it will reach the maximum at p m = 0, i.e., p * m = 0. 4) 8: Similar to 4, the utility ia a concave function, A, B, C have the same value as in 4, and we have:
After getting the closed-form expression of C, we get:
Considering the non-negativity of power, if p m > 0, we can obtain p * m = p m , else p * m = 0.
Based on the analysis above, we can conclude that when power cost of the mth PU is too high or current transmission power meets the communication requirement, the mth PU chooses to stop transmitting. Otherwise, it will choose the optimal power based on equation (26) .
Through the sub-gradient update method [34] , we can derive the dual variable λ m (m ∈ M) , ψ n (n ∈ N ) , µ through iterations:
where t represents the iteration number, t λ m , t ψ n and t µ represents the iteration step of the mth PU, nth RU and jammer, respectively. The optimal power control strategy can be obtained through the multi-user hierarchical iterative algorithm (MHIA), which is shown in Algorithm 1.
D. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
Theorem 4: Stackelberg Equilibrium would always exist in the formulated anti-jamming Bayesian Three-layer Stackelberg game.
Proof: For relay users, after given PUs' transmission power set P, the vice-leader subgame reduced to a noncooperative game. And the strategy space of vice-leaders is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of some Euclidean space. Moreover, the RUs' utilities are continuous and concave with respect to q n . So there exists the best response (BR) in the vice-leader subgame which had been proved in [39] . Similarly, for the jammer, when obtained PUs' and RUs' transmission power set P, Q, there also exists the best response in the follower subgame. Let BR(P), BR(P, Q) denotes the relay user's and jammer's best response, respectively. Based on the above analysis, the SE can be defined as follows:
Thus it can be proved that there exist q * n , p * m which need to satisfy the following condition: Jamming power J (t), the maximum jamming power J max , channel gain β, dual variable µ(t), and jamming cost E. (c) Initialization of vice-leaders:
The nth relay user's transmission power q n (t), the maximum transmission power of relay q max , channel gain η n , dual variable ψ n (t), transmission cost
The mth primary user's transmission power p m (t), the maximum transmission power of mth
can be obtained according to equation (9) based onp 1 (t), . . . ,p m (t), . . . ,p M (t) and q 1 (t), . . . ,q n (t), . . .,q N (t).
(c) q n (t + 1), n ∈ N can be obtained according to equation
End iteration
Proof: According to jammer's utility function, we can get its second-order derivative ∂ 2 V ∂J 2 < 0 from equation (10) which means it is a concave function of J . Based on duality optimization theory [33] , [34] , there exists the unique best response BR(P * , Q * ) for the jammer. Similarly, the relay's utility is a concave function of because of ∂ 2 R ∂q 2 n < 0 from equation (19) , so the best response of relay user BR(P * ) is unique. Moreover, each primary user has a unique power p * m which had been analyzed in Section IV-C. Therefore, the SE is unique in the formulated anti-jamming Bayesian threelayer Stackelberg game.
E. NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF THE STATIC GAME
Different from the Stackelberg game, when all the users and jammer choose respective transmission power VOLUME 7, 2019 simultaneously, we can model the power control problem as a static game. Moreover, Nash Equilibrium as the optimal strategy of the static game is obtained and compared with Stackelberg Equilibrium.
Theorem 6: The Nash Equilibrium exists in the static game.
Proof: Based on the utility function of primary user, relay and jammer, we can get:
Based on the analysis above, we can obtain NE through the following cases: (37), and we find relay's utility decreases with q i because ∂R ∂q i < 0, i.e., q * i = 0. In order to make J * = J , taking q * i , J * into ∂V ∂J = 0 and we can get: (36), and we find primary user's utility decreases with p i because ∂U i ∂p i < 0, i.e., p * i = 0. In order to make J * = J , taking p * i , J * into ∂V ∂J = 0 and we can get:
3) Case 3 : (38), we get ∂V ∂J < 0 and J * = 0. Based on the analysis above, when the channel state and transmission cost meet Case 1, i.e., the primary user's cost is low and its channel gain meets transmission demand, primary user adjusts optimal power and relay user stop helping PU transmit any more. While in situation Case 2, when the relay user's cost is small and its channel gain is large, it would select power to transmit messages. Contrarily, if both primary user's and relay user's cost are too high, all the users will stop transmission temporarily. And jammer would choose whether to transmit jamming signals based on the current communication status.
In the above analysis, we derive the closed-form expressions of Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) in the Bayesian Stackelberg game, and Nash equilibrium (NE) in the static game, respectively. Under the Stackelberg game frame, the hierarchical characteristics between users and jammer can be better reflected. To further verify the effectiveness of Stackelberg game, simulation results are shown in Section IV.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we set simulation parameters firstly, then we show some simulation results and give the relative discussions. We analyze the power convergence process of the proposed game firstly. Then, we compare both users' and jammer's utilities of Stackelberg Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium under observation error. In the last, we analyze the influence of incomplete information, jamming distance and jamming cost on utility.
In the simulation, we assume the transmission cost 
A. POWER CONVERGENCE OF THE PROPOSED GAME
The convergence to Stackelberg Equilibrium is shown in Fig. 4 . In the beginning of Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game, primary users choose initial power to transmit messages. In order to ensure the communication quality, relay users select optimal power to help PUs forward information and guarantee communication quality. Then jammer increases jamming power to deteriorate the communication performance, which causes the decline of transmission power because of the strong interference. The advantage of the proposed scheme is that both PUs and RUs could choose low power under strong interference or high power under weak interference to increase communication quality, because users can make strategies after knowing the optimal strategy of jammer. After about 15 iterations, all users and jammer have converged to the Stackelberg Equilibrium, which also verifies the existence of SE. Fig. 5 shows the influence of observation error ε (ε here refers to ε i ) on the primary users' utilities of SE and NE. Under the same observation error, the primary users of SE have a higher utility compared to NE, which proves the effectiveness of proposed game. The observation error ε i means the deviation between the ith primary user's actual transmission power and jammer's observation result. It can be seen from the diagram that primary user's utility is an increasing function of ε i , because a greater observation error represents the users' information observed by jammer deviates more from the actual value, which is beneficial to users. Moreover, a Bayesian two-layer Stackelberg game is formulated in the non-relay situation, and the SE of Bayesian two-layer and three-layer Stackelberg game are compared. As shown in Fig. 5 , users' utilities are prominently improved compared to the non-relay situation, which showed the existence of relay can effectively improve users' utilities.
B. THE UTILITY COMPARISON OF SE AND NE UNDER OBSERVATION ERROR
In Fig. 6 , we can find the relay's utility is a increasing function of observation error ε (ε here refers to ε (r) i ) and the utility of SE is lower than NE, among which ε (r) i means the deviation between the ith relay user's actual transmission power and jammer's observation result. On the contrary, the jammer's utility of SE is higher than NE, because jammer would learn the users' transmission power rapidly and make a strategy then in the proposed game. And jammer's utility is a decreasing function of observation error ε (ε here refers to ε i and ε (r) i ) because the greater observation error is, the larger deviation between jammer's observation result and actual value is, which affects jammer's decision-making and causes a lower utility. In Fig. 9 , we can see the influence of the jamming distance on utilities of users and relay. Based on the simplified pathloss model β = w −δ , the increase of jamming distance causes the decrease of channel gain β. For jammer, its utility is a negative function and an increasing function of β, while users are opposite to jammer, the utilities of primary users and relay are decreasing functions of β. In the simulation, we adjust jamming distance from 20km to 40km with change of 2.5km each time. We find the greater jamming distance is, the lower channel gain β is, and the higher users' and relay's utilities are, which corresponds with the analysis above. In Fig. 10 , the increase of jamming cost means jammer need pay a higher price under the same jamming power, which reduces the influence of jammer and causes the decrease of jammer's utility, while improves the primary users' and relay's utilities correspondingly at the same time. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we mainly investigated the power control problem in relay-assisted anti-jamming communication systems. Considering the competitive interactions between users and jammer, an anti-jamming Bayesian three-layer Stackelberg game was proposed, in which primary users acted as leaders, relay users acted as vice-leaders and jammer acted as follower. The transmission power of users and jammer converged to Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) by continuous iterations, and we also gave the proof of the existence and uniqueness of SE. Moreover, simulation results were shown to prove the effectiveness of the proposed game, and we also analyzed the influence of observation error, incomplete information, jamming distance and jamming cost on utility. In the future, we will take the channel allocation and co-channel mutual interference into consideration to further improve the communication anti-jamming ability. 
